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espanolEste articulo tiene como objetivo explorar dos objeciones planteadas en contra del segundo enfoque defendido por Bulygin en relacion con la definicion de la naturaleza de las reglas juridicas que otorgan competencia juridica. Segun la primera, tal enfoque es vago en cuanto a lo que estas reglas juridicas definen. Esta vaguedad se debe a la falta de una definicion adecuada de la competencia juridica. Defendere la reduccion de la complejidad de definientia definiendo la competencia juridica como una especie de competencia en sentido general. Segun la segunda, este enfoque no reduccionista no puede explicar la normatividad de este tipo de reglas. Contra este enfoque, sostendre que las reglas juridicas que otorgan competencia desempenan tanto una funcion deontica como una funcion definitoria en cuanto reglas constitutivas de la practica juridica. EnglishThis paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin’s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal power-conferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice.

Commanding and Defining. On Eugenio Bulygin’s Theory of Legal Power-Conferring Rules