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I consider the problem of an independent inventor attempting to sell a cost-reducing innovation in an oligopoly setting.  There are N potential buyers and the inventor possesses private information regarding the value of the invention.  A revealing equilibrium is characterized in which the inventors demand signals the value of the invention to each potential buyer.  I find that both the inventors demand and his continuation value increase as the number of firms left in the sequence of potential buyers increases.  I also find that a firms probability of rejecting the inventors demand is higher the sooner the firm is approached in the sequence.

A Sequential Signaling Model of the Sale of an Invention to an Oligopolist