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RESUMO: O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais criticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpretation and Legal Theory , apresenta a concepcao de interpretacao defendida por Ronald Dworkin. Em um primeiro momento, Marmor sugere que, para Dworkin, toda e qualquer conclusao sobre o Direito seria objeto de interpretacao, o que nao seria correto quando analisamos, por exemplo, o modo como seguimos certas regras e convencoes. Em um segundo momento, Marmor argumenta que a perspectiva dworkiniana defende uma objetividade impossivel de ser alcancada na interpretacao: o fato de que compartilhamos valores de natureza incomensuravel, por exemplo, implica na impossibilidade de se considerar que uma interpretacao sera, todas as coisas consideradas, melhor que outra. Analisando tais criticas a luz das respostas que Dworkin ofereceu ou poderia ter oferecido, conclui-se que a visao de Marmor sobre a concepcao dworkiniana de interpretacao e incorreta, na medida em que ignora distincoes que lhe sao centrais, como a diferenca entre “conceitos criteriais” e “conceitos interpretativos”, e sobre a natureza integrada dos valores que compartilhamos socialmente. Ainda assim, o debate entre ambos os autores ressalta sua clara natureza metodologica, sendo importante para a compreensao do “estado da arte” da Teoria do Direito contemporânea de vertente analitica. ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the main criticisms presented in Andrei Marmor's Interpretation and Legal Theory to Ronald Dworkin's conception of interpretation. In the first criticism, Marmor suggests that in Dworkin's theory each and every conclusion about what the law is in a given case is a result of interpretation, which cannot be correct when we think, for example, about the way we follow certain rules and conventions. In the second criticism, Marmor argues Dworkin supports an impossible objectivity view on interpretation: the fact that we share values of incommensurable nature, for example, implies that it is impossible to consider that one interpretation can be the best, all things considered. Considering both criticisms and the answers that Dworkin offered or could have offered to it, this paper concludes Marmor's view about Dworkin's concept of interpretation is incorrect, considering that Marmor ignores central distinctions of Dworkinian thought, such as the difference between "criterial” and “interpretive” concepts, and about the integrated nature of values we share on society. Nevertheless, the debate emphasizes its methodological nature, and is important to understand the state of art of the analytical contemporary legal theory.

Interpretation and Legal Theory: as críticas de Andrei Marmor ao interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin