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It is often assumed that the so-called “Frege-Geach argument” refutes expressivism, i.e. the view that moral sentences do not primarily state facts, but express attitudes or emotions. In this paper, I attempt to rebut that assumption and to show that the Frege-Geach argument poses no serious threat to expressivism. After an initial presentation of the Frege-Geach argument (Section 1), I try to pave the way for a defence of expressivism by delineating what the expressivist has to do and not to do in order to defend himself against it (Section 2). This preliminary step, I argue, provides the expressivist with a convenient reply to the Frege-Geach objection (Section 3). Finally I discuss Blackburn’s strategy of defending expressivism against this objection and try to show that, though in a manner unintended by Blackburn, the failure of this strategy lends support to expressivism (Section 4).

WHY THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM DOES NOT REFUTE EXPRESSIVISM