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A famous passage in the first  Critique  (A 557 f.) often gives rise to the belief that Kant had not yet delivered a full treatment of freedom in 1781 and intended to shift this treatment to future writings. However, a closer inspection of the passage reveals that, to the contrary, Kant claims that due to the limitations of human reason his  critical  account of freedom given thus far must be considered complete. And indeed, this account reappears unchanged in the  Groundwork . When considered in this light, not only do the exact achievements of the first  Critique  concerning Kant’s doctrine of freedom become evident, but so too does the further development of this doctrine. In 1785, the  Groundwork  supplies a new  conceptual  link between freedom and the moral law (and with it an explanation of the possibility of  categorical  imperatives). And thanks to this very link, Kant is able, in the second  Critique  (1787/88), to remedy a ‘dogmatic’ mistake (discovered by a reviewer in 1786) in his 1781/85 account of freedom.

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‚Die  Kritik der reinen Vernunft  hat die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit nicht bewiesen, ja nicht einmal deren Möglichkeit.‘: Über die folgenreiche Fehlinterpretation eines Absatzes in der  Kritik der reinen Vernunft .