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Kant identifies knowledge [ Wissen ], belief [ Glaube ], and opinion [ Meinung ] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [ Fürwahrhalten ]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the  Critique of Pure Reason  and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote” good inquiry; and, though rarely mentioned in the secondary literature, it offers Kant’s methodological alternative to the traditional epistemological goal of finding “a sufficient and yet at the same time general criterion of truth”.

Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic