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Representatives of ‘philosophy of mind’ such as Michael Pauen think about the issue of mind and brain as if they were solving a linguistic puzzle. At first glance this approach appears to be particularly objective, but actually it contains misleading simplifications, logical failures and categorical mistakes at crucial points in the train of thought. This article demonstrates that the claim of identity of mind and brain only makes sense if one presupposes neuroconstructivism and strong naturalism already in the very composition of the identity-oriented argument. According to naturalism, every occurrence, thus also our subjectivity and our personal acts, are conditioned sufficiently by the causal mechanism of actions. Intentionality is thus reduced to a causal mechanism and consciousness to a psychophysical state. When theorists like Gerhard Roth or Michael Pauen interpret observations of brain science to the effect that our lives are determined by neurobiological processes and that freedom of will in a strong sense is impossible, then they will only find in their interpretations what they ideologically put in beforehand.

Die Konfusion der Identitätstheorie mit dem Neurokonstruktivismus und deterministischen Naturalismus – demonstriert am Ansatz von Michael Pauen