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It is now common to explain some of incidental perception’s features by means of a different capacity, called  phantasia .  Phantasia , usually translated as ‘imagination,’ is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of  De Anima  3.3, 428b10–29a9, I argue against this and for  perception first :  phantasia  is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained directly by  phantasia , and  phantasia  is never a part of perception.  Phantasia  is not imagination or representation, as many have thought, but perception-like appearance. Aristotle thus recognizes alongside three different types of perception three different types of perception-like appearance.

Aristotle on Perception and Perception-like Appearance: De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9