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“Assume a theory T has been strongly empirically successful in a domain of applications A , but was superseded later on by a superior theory T * which was likewise successful in A , but has an arbitrarily different theoretical superstructure. Then under certain (natural) conditions, T contains theoretical expression(s) e which ‘yielded’ T ’s empirical success, such that these T expressions correspond (in A ) to certain theoretical expression(s) e * of T *, in the form of a conditional equivalence “if A, then ( e iff e *)” which is entailed by the union of T * with a T *-consistent part of T .” The theorem depends on a crucial condition concerning the predecessor theory T which requires that T contains a theoretical expression e which figures as a common cause for several empirical regularities by which it can be indicated or measured in the form of bilateral ‘reduction’ sentences. I illustrate my correspondence theorem by several historical examples, such as the phlogiston-oxygen example. In the second part of my talk I focus on the semantic and ontological interpretation of the correspondence theorem. It does not entail a reduction of the meaning. However, it entails the reduction of the (strong) empirical success of the theoretical term e within T to the empirical success of the theoretical term e * within T *. In other words, the T - T *-correspondence explains why theory T was empirically successful in spite of the fact that the ontology of T ’s theoretical part was false, from the viewpoint of the presently accepted theory T *. In the final part I explain how the correspondence theorem justifies a weak version of scientific realism without presupposing the reliability of the no-miracle argument.

PRESERVATION OF EMPIRICAL SUCCESS AND INTERTHEORETICAL CORRESPONDENCE: JUSTIFYING REALISM WITHOUT THE NO MIRACLES ARGUMENT