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The nature of the relation between logic and psychology is recognized to be an important albeit difficult topic for understanding Kant s aims and argumentation in his theoretical philosophy, particularly, in the Critique of Pure Reason. The recent commentators who have tried to understand and to defend Kant s views have warned readers not to confuse our, postFregean understanding with Kant s own understanding of the terms like “logic”, “mind”, “psychology”, and “cognition”. One such view that the commentators have noted is that in Kant s philosophy logic and psychology are intertwined in a way that is perhaps difficult for us today to fully appreciate or even sympathize with. It is noted, for example, that for Kant the talk about “the rules of logic” is inseparable from the talk about “mental activities” or “cognitive faculties”. In this connection, some have suggested that Kant s view is more in line with the view of the relation between logic and the mind that is elaborated in the Port-Royal logic. Even among these commentators, however, there seems to be no consensus on precisely how the relation between logic and psychology is to

Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant