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Abstract. The main research on the cognitive foundations of the economy has claimed for many years that there is a clear separation between the theory of economic rationality and the psychology of reasoning and economic decision. More recently, the relationship between the two disciplines has become increasingly tight and cross-fertilizing. While Economics proposes normative theories about what it means to decide rationally, Psychology provides an explanation as to why individuals frequently make irrational decisions. The role of intuition in decision-making, as well as the effect of emotions, are also relevant. The issue of rationality should then be tackled by finding appropriate restrictions of the definition of the term 'rational', which in its common usage stands for 'reasonable' and/or 'acceptable to reason'. Economics and psychology can then find a common and useful ground of discussion by focusing on coherence rather than on substance. (Legrenzi and Girotto 1996). As acknowledged by the mainstream theory, the notion of Bounded Rationality (Simon 1972) is central in explaining the failures of human decision making processes. Therefore took this concept as our starting point in the analysis of the complexity behind the individual choices, taking into account the cross-fertilizing relationship between economics and psychology.Keywords: Coordination, Decision, Economics, Psychology, RationalityJEL Classification: B4, D81, D83IntroductionThe discovery of the existence of social preferences, understood as positive and/or negative predispositions towards the social and economic conditions of others, complicates in a decisive way the theory of economic rationality. The latter binds the decision only to reasons of individual utility, without any interest in the plight of others. To be changed radically by these are also the models of strategic interaction. Insights and emotions frequently violate all the principles of rationality, but certainly do not eliminate them. One has the sensation of a cognitive duplicity where rational logic and emotions are forced to cohabit. What determines the prevalence of intuition over reasoning or vice-versa? It is conceivable that the context with the factors conditioning it assumes a decisive role. But because the contexts cannot all be summarized in a theoretical model, what follows is the awareness of the extreme complexity and non-linearity of the phenomena that are often the result of the interaction of different economic agents. What arises is an extreme difficulty to develop models with a comprehensive predictive capacity and the holistic impossibility of explaining economic phenomena, abolishing the role of individual economic action and its cognitive genesis.In addition to that criticism to unlimited rationality does not rely only on the awareness of the reduced computational capacity and of calculating the conscious and intentional part of the human mind. In reality, such a limiting condition pairs with the influence of intuitive, emotional, affective, tacit factors that characterize the intuitive mind (as opposed to the conscious reasoning mind). Therefore, the choices and decisions of homo oeconomicus are moving on a strongly connected cognitive duplicity, with the prevalence of one or the other of the components that is heavily dependent, typically on the situations and contexts; but also on the different attitude compared to emotional categories such as regret (Loomes and Sugden 1982) or disappointment (Gul 1991). This leads to the necessity of building the decisional context, one that incorporates information from the "environment" and of the mental and behavioural model of the individual actor. The conclusion that follows that is that the "decision" has nothing axiomatic to it, being the final act of a previous and complex process that involves objective and subjective conditions (as, moreover, already generally contained in Simon's concept of bounded rationality, 1972). …

The decision-making process between convention and cognition