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The extent to which the policymaking process is majoritarian, rather than controlled by the majority party, is a fundamental question in U.S. congressional politics, and in collective choice institutions broadly. Previous research has examined whether some House rules empower the minority party to propose alternative legislation to the floor and circumvent the majority party’s agenda power. I argue the motion to instruct conferees allows the minority to influence policy during the conference process. Motions to instruct are the prerogative of the minority party, are frequently offered, and are frequently passed by the chamber. They substantially moderate conference bills as compared to those bills without a motion to instruct, suggesting that the procedure weakens majority party agenda power. Further, the minority may offer a motion to instruct intended to fail as a way of demonstrating policy extremity to voters, consistent with blame-game bargaining models.

Motions to instruct conferees as a majoritarian tool in the U.S. house