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Throughout 2014 and 2015 Russia annexed Crimea and helped secessionist forces in Eastern Ukraine. However, interventions are nothing new to modern Russia. In 2008 Russia invaded Abkhazia and South Ossetia unilaterally after the Russo-Georgian War. The question arises: what drives Russia’s leaders, namely President Putin, to acquire new territories? Normative theories have proven inadequate at predicting Putin’s decisionmaking in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and thus, this paper analyzes these developments through the lens of practice theory. This paper proposes that Putin’s innate learning during his upbringing, and during his time in the Комите́т госуда́рственной безопа́сности (KGB), has tempered his diplomatic practice. Surrounding himself with likeminded policymakers, and embedding a carefully crafted propaganda image, we call it a new Putinism, has prevailed in Russian diplomatic practice. This proposed concept is based on five premises: Russian ethno-centrism, not being scared of the global West, secrecy, disdain for multilateral institutions, and the creation of a Russian sphere of influence. The paper concludes that Russia is likely to continue annexing close-by lands as a way of legitimizing the regime of President Putin.

Invasion as a Practice: Understanding State Behavior in Putin’s Russia