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Temperature sensing and control systems are widely used in the closed-loopcontrol of critical processes such as maintaining the thermal stability ofpatients, or in alarm systems for detecting temperature-related hazards.However, the security of these systems has yet to be completely explored,leaving potential attack surfaces that can be exploited to take control overcritical systems.  In this paper we investigate the reliability of temperature-based controlsystems from a security and safety perspective. We show how unexpectedconsequences and safety risks can be induced by physical-level attacks onanalog temperature sensing components. For instance, we demonstrate that anadversary could remotely manipulate the temperature sensor measurements of aninfant incubator to cause potential safety issues, without tampering with thevictim system or triggering automatic temperature alarms. This attack exploitsthe unintended rectification effect that can be induced in operational andinstrumentation amplifiers to control the sensor output, tricking the internalcontrol loop of the victim system to heat up or cool down. Furthermore, we showhow the exploit of this hardware-level vulnerability could affect differentclasses of analog sensors that share similar signal conditioning processes.  Our experimental results indicate that conventional defenses commonlydeployed in these systems are not sufficient to mitigate the threat, so wepropose a prototype design of a low-cost anomaly detector for criticalapplications to ensure the integrity of temperature sensor signals.

Trick or Heat? Manipulating Critical Temperature-Based Control Systems Using Rectification Attacks