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In the Bitcoin system, participants are rewarded for solving cryptographicpuzzles. In order to receive more consistent rewards over time, someparticipants organize mining pools and split the rewards from the pool inproportion to each participant's contribution. However, several attacksthreaten the ability to participate in pools. The block withholding (BWH)attack makes the pool reward system unfair by letting malicious participantsreceive unearned wages while only pretending to contribute work. When two poolslaunch BWH attacks against each other, they encounter the miner's dilemma: in aNash equilibrium, the revenue of both pools is diminished. In another attackcalled selfish mining, an attacker can unfairly earn extra rewards bydeliberately generating forks. In this paper, we propose a novel attack calleda fork after withholding (FAW) attack. FAW is not just another attack. Thereward for an FAW attacker is always equal to or greater than that for a BWHattacker, and it is usable up to four times more often per pool than in BWHattack. When considering multiple pools - the current state of the Bitcoinnetwork - the extra reward for an FAW attack is about 56% more than that for aBWH attack. Furthermore, when two pools execute FAW attacks on each other, theminer's dilemma may not hold: under certain circumstances, the larger pool canconsistently win. More importantly, an FAW attack, while using intentionalforks, does not suffer from practicality issues, unlike selfish mining. We alsodiscuss partial countermeasures against the FAW attack, but finding a cheap andefficient countermeasure remains an open problem. As a result, we expect to seeFAW attacks among mining pools.

Be Selfish and Avoid Dilemmas: Fork After Withholding (FAW) Attacks on Bitcoin