English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Software-based attacks exploit bugs or vulnerabilities to get unauthorized access or leak confidential information. Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is a security technique to track spurious information flows and provide strong security guarantees against such attacks. To secure heterogeneous systems, the spurious information flows must be tracked through all their components, including processors, accelerators (i.e., application-specific hardware components) and memories. We present PAGURUS, a flexible methodology to design a low-overhead shell circuit that adds DIFT support to accelerators. The shell uses a coarse-grain DIFT approach, thus not requiring to make modifications to the accelerator&#x2019;s implementation. We analyze the performance and area overhead of the DIFT shell on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and we propose a metric, called information leakage, to measure its security guarantees. We perform a design-space exploration to show that we can synthesize accelerators with different characteristics in terms of performance, cost, and security guarantees. We also present a case study where we use the DIFT shell to secure an accelerator running on an embedded platform with a DIFT-enhanced RISC-V core.

PAGURUS: Low-Overhead Dynamic Information Flow Tracking on Loosely Coupled Accelerators