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This article takes as its point of departure my rejection of moral skepticism. Moral skepticism is understood here not as moral relativism (namely, the thesis that the correctness of moral principles is relative to various communities or other groups), but instead as an insistence on the sway of indeterminacy in the realm of morality. A skeptic maintains that, to every moral question or nearly every moral question, there is no determinately correct answer. In the eyes of skeptics, the discretion of someone replying to any such question is largely unrestricted. In the third chapter of my forthcoming book Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine, I have sought to expose the fallacies in the arguments propounded by moral skeptics. Yet, given that such theorists have wildly exaggerated the degree of the indeterminacy that is present in the domain of morality, how far should we go in rejecting their skeptical claims? In legal philosophy, Ronald Dworkin has long affirmed that there is a uniquely correct answer to every legal question or virtually every legal question that might arise in any particular jurisdiction. Is a similar stance warranted in moral philosophy? Dworkin himself has based his view of law's determinacy partly on his belief that—at least in any legal system relevantly similar to that of the United States—the answers to legal questions are determined not only by the familiar materials of law such as statutes and adjudicative rulings and administrative regulations and constitutional provisions, but also by the most attractive moral principles that are immanent in those materials. That is, he believes that the uniquely correct legal answer in every case is the uniquely correct moral response to the problem raised by the case (in the light of the institutional history within which the case arises). For him, the comprehensive determinacy of law rests on the comprehensive determinacy of morality. Is he right to think that the moral realm partakes of perfect determinacy?

When Is There Not One Right Answer?