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Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a meansto arrive at optimal conditions for resolving social dilemmas. Yet recentresearch highlights that the interdependence between networks may be just asimportant as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introducecoevolution of strategy and network interdependence to study whether it cangive rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. Weshow that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yieldoptimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremelyadverse conditions cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks theywould perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society,with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of theinterdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving to theupper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compactclusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependenceconfers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even thetoughest of social dilemmas.

Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution