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At independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan inherited the former Soviet Union's distinct 'semi-presidential' system combining a robust president, a weak parliament, and a meek prime minister. Its governance then was categorized as a 'president-parliamentary' system under Shugart and Carey's typology. However, Kyrgyzstan's 2010 'April Revolution' paved the way for a new 'premier-presidential' system intended to elevate the status of the prime minister and parliament and thereby diffuse power among rival political elites. This 'premier-presidential' system turned out to be a short-lived experiment: the 2020 'October Uprising' resulted in a turn to a system of 'strong presidentialism'. This study aims to present an analysis of the fissures in the 'premier-presidential' system of 2010-2020 which eventually contributed to its downfall. It argues that the downfall of the premier-presidential system was primarily caused by two sets of factors, structural and contingent, working in tandem.

Exploring the Faultlines in Kyrgyzstan's Post 2010 Premier-Presidential System