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This paper analyzes the sensitivity of antineutrino count rate measurementsto changes in the fissile content of civil power reactors. Such measurementsmay be useful in IAEA reactor safeguards applications. We introduce ahypothesis testing procedure to identify statistically significant differencesbetween the antineutrino count rate evolution of a standard 'baseline' fuelcycle and that of an anomalous cycle, in which plutonium is removed andreplaced with an equivalent fissile worth of uranium. The test would allow aninspector to detect anomalous reactor activity, or to positively confirm thatthe reactor is operating in a manner consistent with its declared fuelinventory and power level. We show that with a reasonable choice of detectorparameters, the test can detect replacement of 73 kg of plutonium in 90 dayswith 95% probability, while controlling the false positive rate at 5%. We showthat some improvement on this level of sensitivity may be expected by variousmeans, including use of the method in conjunction with existing reactorsafeguards methods. We also identify a necessary and sufficient dailyantineutrino count rate to achieve the quoted sensitivity, and list examples ofdetectors in which such rates have been attained.

Detection of Anomalous Reactor Activity Using Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution Over the Course of a Reactor Cycle