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In numerous contexts, individuals may decide whether they take actions tomitigate the spread of disease, or not. Mitigating the spread of diseaserequires an individual to change their routine behaviours to benefit others,resulting in a 'disease dilemma' similar to the seminal prisoner's dilemma. Inthe classical prisoner's dilemma, evolutionary game dynamics predict that allindividuals evolve to 'defect.' We have discovered that when the rate ofcooperation within a population is directly linked to the rate of spread of thedisease, cooperation evolves under certain conditions. For diseases which donot confer immunity to recovered individuals, if the time scale at whichindividuals receive information is sufficiently rapid compared to the timescale at which the disease spreads, then cooperation emerges. Moreover, in thelimit as mitigation measures become increasingly effective, the disease can becontrolled, and the rate of infections tends to zero. Our model is based ontheoretical mathematics and therefore unconstrained to any single context. Forexample, the disease spreading model considered here could also be used todescribe social and group dynamics. In this sense, we may have discovered afundamental and novel mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in a broadsense.

Decisions and disease: a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation