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We present cryptanalyses of the AURORA-512 hash function, which is a SHA-3 candidate. We first describe a collision attack on AURORA-512. We then show a second-preimage attack on AURORA-512/-384 and explain that the randomized hashing can also be attacked. We finally show a full key-recovery attack on HMAC-AURORA-512 and universal forgery on HMAC-AURORA-384. Our attack exploits weaknesses in a narrow-pipe mode of operation of AURORA-512 named "Double-Mix Merkle-Damgård (DMMD)," which produces 512-bit output by updating two 256-bit chaining variables in parallel. We do not look inside of the compression function. Hence, our attack can work even if the compression function is regarded as a random oracle. The time complexity of our collision attack is approximately 2236 AURORA-512 operations, and 2236脳512 bits of memory is required. Our second-preimage attack works on any given message. The time complexity is approximately 2290 AURORA-512 operations, and 2288脳512 bits of memory is required. Our key-recovery attack on HMAC-AURORA-512, which uses 512-bit secret keys, requires 2257 queries, 2259 off-line AURORA-512 operations, and a negligible amount of memory. The universal forgery on HMAC-AURORA-384 is also possible by combining the second-preimage and key-recovery attacks.

Cryptanalyses of Narrow-Pipe Mode of Operation in AURORA-512 Hash Function